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COMMENT
Trade Regulation-The North Carolina Consumer
Protection Act of 1977
In the spring of 1975 the Attorney General of North Carolina broke
new ground' in the field of consumer protection by filing a civil action under
North Carolina's unfair trade practices law2 to enjoin 3 the abusive debt
collection practices of the J.C. Penney Company. The attorney general was
unsuccessful in the resulting lawsuit. In State ex reL Edmisten v. .C.
Penney Co. 4 the North Carolina Supreme Court severely limited the scope
of North Carolina's unfair trade practices law by narrowly construing the
phrase "trade or commerce" and concluding that debt collection practices
1. See Raleigh, N.C., News & Observer, Nov. 27, 1975, at 1, col. 4.
2. Law of June 12, 1969, ch. 833, § l(b), 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 930 (formerly codified as
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1975)). See generally Aycock, Antitrust and Unfair Trade Practice
Law in North Carolina-Federal Law Compared, 50 N.C.L. REV. 199 (1972); Morgan, The
People's Advocate in the Marketplace-The Role of the North Carolina Attorney General in the
Field of Consumer Protection, 6 WAKE FOREST INTRA. L. REV. 1 (1969); Comment, Consumer
Protection and Unfair Competition in North Carolina-The 1969 Legislation, 48 N.C.L. REV.
896 (1970); Note, Trade Regulation-N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1-Unfair or Deceptive Acts or
Practices in the Conduct of Trade or Commerce, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 484 (1976).
3. A civil action by the attorney general to obtain injunctive relief is authorized by N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 75-14 (1975).
4. 292 N.C. 311, 233 S.E.2d895 (1977), rev'g 30 N.C. App. 368,227 S.E.2d 141 (1976). In
the supreme court Justice Copeland wrote the opinion for a five to two majority. Justice
Huskins submitted a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Exum concurred. In the superior court
the attorney general had obtained a temporary restraining order prohibiting J.C. Penney from
harassing its credit customers, but that order was later dissolved and a motion for a preliminary
injunction was denied on the ground that "such conduct does not fall within the purview of
G.S. 75-1.1." 30 N.C. App. at 370, 227 S.E.2d at 144. The State appealed that decision to the
North Carolina Court of Appeals, and that court reversed and remanded the case with instruc-
tions to enter the preliminary injunction on the ground that "the conduct complained of does
fall within the scope prohibited by G.S. 75-1.1." Id. at 372, 227 S.E.2d at 144. Judge Arnold
wrote the opinion for the court of appeals. Judge Hedrick concurred in that opinion; Judge
Parker dissented.
5. Law of June 12, 1969, ch. 833, § l(b), 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 930 (formerly codified as
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1. l(a) (1975)). Prior to the Penney decision there had been indications that
this section would be broadly construed. In 1969, following enactment of the original version of
§ 75-1.1(a), Robert Morgan, then Attorney General of North Carolina, stated that the objective
of his office was to "maintain at least a minimum standard of integrity and freedom in the
marketplace in dealings between buyers and sellers at all levels of commerce." Morgan, supra
note 2, at 3. Similar language was used in the original version of § 75-1.1(b). Morgan also
referred to "the broad authority" that was granted by § 75-1.1. Id. at 19.
Prior to Penney, the North Carolina Supreme Court had had only one opportunity to
construe the original version of § 75-1. 1. On that occasion, in Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303,218
S.E.2d 342 (1975), the court implied that it would take a liberal approach to the statute. See
Note, Consumer Protection-Hardy v. Toler, 54 N.C.L. REv. 963 (1976). As one commentator
remarked, "Hardy indicates a judicial attitude opposed to the imposition of unnatural
constraints on the purposely broad and inclusive language used." Note, supra note 2, at 489.
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were not within the scope of that law. 6 At the conclusion of its opinion,
however, the court invited the general assembly to amend the statute, 7 and
the general assembly responded to that invitation by enacting the Con-
sumer Protection Act of 1977 (CPA).'
The CPA made four major changes in the existing law: (1) the text of
the basic unfair trade practices provision, section 75-1. 1(a), was amended9
so that the language of that section is now precisely the same as section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act; t° (2) section 75-1.1(b) was
rewritten to preclude the application of the North Carolina unfair trade
practices law to the rendering of professional services;'1 (3) section 75-15.2
was added to provide for the imposition of civil penalties in suits brought by
the attorney general under the unfair trade practices law; 12 and (4) sections
75-50 to 75-56 were added' 3 prohibiting certain debt collection practices 14
and providing limited remedies for that type of unfair trade practice.i5
I. ADOPTION OF FTC AcT WORDING
When section 75-1.1(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes was
enacted in 1969, the language of that section 16 closely paralleled that of the
Only one writer seems to have anticipated the definitional problem created by the use of the
phrase "trade or commerce." See Comment, supra note 2, at 905-06.
Since the Penney decision, the North Carolina Court of Appeals has decided Love v.
Pressley, 34 N.C. App. 503, 239 S.E.2d 574 (1977), applying the original version of § 75-1.1. In
Love the court held that, even after Penney, § 75-1.1 was broad enough to encompass unfair
practices in the leasing of real estate and awarded treble damages to plaintiff-tenant under N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1975). See 34 N.C. App. at 516, 239 S.E.2d at 582-83.
6. 292 N.C. at 320, 233 S.E.2d at 901.
7. "Obviously, if we have not properly interpreted G.S. 75-1. 1, our General Assembly
may amend the statute." Id.
8. Law of June 27, 1977, ch. 747, 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 34 (Pamphlet No. I1, Pt. I)
(codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1.1(a), (b), -15.2, -50 to -56 (Cum. Supp. 1977)). In an
apparently unrelated action, the 1977 General Assembly also enacted two other laws amending
chapter 75 of the North Carolina General Statutes: Law of June 23, 1977, ch. 707, 1977 N.C.
Adv. Legis. Serv. 347 (Pamphlet No. 10, Pt. I) (codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (Cum.
Supp. 1977)) (amending § 75-16 (relating to private actions for damages) "to delete the manda-
tory jury requirements for damages"); Law of June 8, 1977, ch. 498, 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis.
Serv. 137 (Pamphlet No. 9) (codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-27 (Cum. Supp. 1977)) (amending
§ 75-27 (relating to unsolicited goods) "by deleting from the caption the words 'through the
mail' and from the second line thereof the words 'by mail or common carrier' ").
9. Law of June 27, 1977, ch. 747, § 1, 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 34 (Pamphlet No. II,
Pt. I) (codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977)).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
11. Law of June 27, 1977, ch. 747, § 2, 1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 34 (Pamphlet No. 11,
Pt. I) (codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977)).
12. Id. § 3 (codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-15.2 (Cum. Supp. 1977)).
13. Id. § 4 (codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. 99 75-50 to -56 (Cum. Supp. 1977)).
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. 99 75-51 to -55 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
15. Id. § 75-56.
16. "Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful." Law of June 12, 1969, ch.
833, § l(b), 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 930 (formerly codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1. i(a) (1975)).
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then current version of the FTC Act,' 7 but it was not exactly the same. The
North Carolina statute applied to activities "in the conduct of any trade or
commerce,"'' 8 while the FTC Act at that time simply used the term "in
commerce." 19 Noting this discrepancy in language, the court in Penney
concluded that "by modifying the language borrowed from the federal act,
the North Carolina legislature must have intended to alter its meaning to
some extent." 2"
The court acknowledged that the FTC interpretation of "commerce"
was "expansive enough to encompass all business activities, including the
collection of debts,"'" citing several cases in which the FTC had taken
action against abusive collection practices.22 The court also conceded that in
17. "Unfair methods of compatition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices in commerce, are declared unlawful." Act of Mar. 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. Ill
(formerly codified as 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970)) (amended 1975). In 1975, § 5 of the FTC Act
was amended by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvements
Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.
(Supp. V 1975)). The current version of that section reads: "Unfair methods of competition in
or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are
declared unlawful." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975). Curiously, the state supreme court in
Penney cited only this current version of § 5 of the FTC Act, which was not adopted until 1975,
although the court was discussing the intent of the North Carolina legislature when it adopted
thie original version of § 75-1.1(a) in 1969. See 292 N.C. at 314, 233 S.E.2d at 897-98.
18. See note 16 supra.
19. See note 17 supra. The current version of § 5 of the FTC Act uses the phrase "in or
affecting commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
The use of the language "in or affecting commerce" in a state statute is actually rather
pointless. The purpose of adding that language to the FTC Act was to overrule judicial
decisions that had restricted the jurisdiction of the FTC under § 5 of the FTC Act strictly to
interstate transactions. See H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 29-31, reprinted in [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7702, 7712-13. As the phrase "in commerce" in a state statute
could not possibly be restricted to interstate commerce, the use of the words "or affecting"
would appear to be superfluous.
20. 292 N.C. at 316, 233 S.E.2d at 898-99. This conclusion does not seem compelled. The
court, failing to consider the disjunctive character of the phrase "trade or commerce," took the
position that "the word 'trade' was used interchangeably with the word 'commerce' " and
concluded that such usage indicated an intent to narrow the otherwise broad meaning of
"commerce." Id. One commentator has suggested that a more likely reason for the discrepan-
cy between the language of the North Carolina statute and the FTC Act is that the legislature
simply was trying to use language in § 75-1.1(a) that would parallel the language in N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 75-1 (1975), which had been in effect since 1913. Interview with Professor William B.
Aycock, author of Aycock, supra note 2, in Chapel Hill, N.C. (Sept. 30, 1977). Section 75-1,
which is the North Carolina counterpart of the Sherman Act, Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26
Stat. 209 (presently codified as 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970)), uses the language "in restraint of trade or
commerce." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1 (1975) (emphasis added). Justice Huskins, in dissent in
Penney, reached the conclusion that the phrase "trade or commerce" was broad enough to
include collection activities. See 292 N.C. at 323-24, 233 S.E.2d at 903 (Huskins, J., dissenting).
21. 292 N.C. at 315, 233 S.E.2d at 898.
22. Id. (citing, e.g., Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1976)). Since 1967 the
FTC has had in effect a set of guides that disapprove certain deceptive collection practices. See
Guides Against Debt Collection Deception, 16 C.F.R. §§ 237.0-.6 (1977). Guides issued by the
FTC are "administrative interpretations of laws" and are intended to provide notice to mem-
bers of an industry that particular conduct is considered unlawful. Id. § 17.1. "Failure to
comply with the guides may result in corrective action by the Commission under applicable
19781
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1975 in Hardy v. Toler23 it had recognized that interpretations of the FTC
Act could furnish "some guidance to the meaning of G.S. 75-1.1.1124 It
concluded, however, that the federal decisions were not controlling. 25 Thus,
on the premise that the legislature intended that section 75-1.1 have a
narrower scope than section 5 of the FTC Act, the court held that it applied
only to acts and practices "involved in the bargain, sale, barter, exchange or
traffic" 26 and did not extend to activities related to debt collection.27
Because the discrepancy in language was the basis of the court's refusal
in Penney to follow FTC precedent with regard to the scope of the statute, 28
the legislature's adoption of the current FTC language in the CPA would
appear to indicate an intention to incorporate into North Carolina law the
body of federal law interpreting the FTC Act. The legislative history of the
CPA, however, makes this assumption somewhat questionable. The version
of the legislation that was first adopted in the House29 included a provision 30
statutory provisions." Id. Although the FTC has not promulgated rules relating to debt
collection practices, in January 1976 it did announce that it intended to promulgate certain rules
in order to codify some aspects of the FTC case law and that it had tentatively designated debt
collection practices as one of the areas for promulgation of trade regulation rules. Trade
Regulation Rules Embodying Case Law Principles-Proposed Rulemaking, 41 Fed. Reg. 3322
(1976), reprinted in [1977] 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 38,005.
It is interesting that, in connection with the Penney case, the operations manager of J.C.
Penney's credit office in Atlanta submitted an affidavit in which he stated that "[a J.C. Penney
collector] is required to adhere to the Federal Trade Commission's guides against deceptive
collection practices .... . Record at 47, State ex rel. Edmisten v. J.C. Penney Co., 30 N.C.
App. 368, 227 S.E.2d 141 (1976). For an analysis of the relationship between FTC rules and*
state law, see Verkuil, Preemption of State Law by the Federal Trade Commission, 1976 DUKE
L.J. 225.
23. 288 N.C. 303, 308, 218 S.E.2d 342, 345 (1975).
24. 292 N.C. at 315, 233 S.E.2d at 898.
25. Id. (citing Horton v. Gulledge, 277 N.C. 353, 177 S.E.2d 885 (1970)).
26. Id. at 316-17, 233 S.E.2d at 899.
27. In reaching this decision the court also relied on the language of the original version of
§ 75-1.1(b):
The purpose of this section is to declare, and to provide civil legal means to maintain,
ethical standards of dealings between persons engaged in business, and between
persons engaged in business and the consuming public within this State, to the end that
good faith and fair dealings between buyers and sellers at all levels of commerce be
had in this State.
Law of June 12, 1969, ch. 833, § l(b), 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 930 (formerly codified as N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b) (1975)). The court placed great emphasis on the phrase "between buyers
and sellers" and stated that, in respect to its debt collection activities, J.C. Penney Company
was a creditor, not a seller, and that "it is only those activities surrounding the 'sale' that are
regulated by G.S. 75-1. 1." 292 N.C. at 317,233 S.E.2d at 899. Justice Huskins pointed out aptly
in dissent: "Debt collection may not be unique to sellers . . .; but if debt collection is not
typical of credit sellers, then bankruptcy soon will be." Id. at 325,233 S.E.2d at 904 (Huskins,
J., dissenting).
28. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
29. The legislation, H. 1050, N.C. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess. (1977), was introduced in
the House on May 2, 1977, and was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary III. A slightly
amended version of the original bill was adopted by the House on June 3, 1977, and was
received by the Senate on June 7, 1977. INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, LEGISLATIVE SERVICE,
BILL HISTORY AS OF 07/01/77.
30. Section 3 of H. 1050, N.C. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess. (2d ed. June 3, 1977), read as
follows:
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requiring that the courts be guided by federal administrative and judicial
interpretations of the FTC Act, but that provision was eliminated by the
Senate and was not included in the final version of the CPA. 31 It is possible
that the courts may interpret this direct rejection of such a provision as an
indication that, despite the identical language, the legislature did not intend
for the courts necessarily to follow FTC interpretations. 32 The courts,
however, probably will adhere to the position stated in Hardy3 3 and recog-
nize that they should be guided by, if not controlled by, interpretations of
the FFC Act. In the absence of discrepancies in the language, there would
appear to be no basis for departing from that policy.
G.S. 75-1.1 is further amended by adding a subsection (e) to read as follows:
"(e) In construing this section, the courts of this State shall be guided by the
interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts to §
5(a)(l) of the Federal Trade Commission Act. . . .However, it is the intent of the
legislature to foster free and ethical competition, and to give the consuming public of
North Carolina the greatest possible measure of protection. Therefore, our courts
shall interpret this section to forbid acts and practices not proscribed by the Federal
Trade Commission or the federal courts if to do so would serve the interests of good
faith, justice, and equity."
Nineteen states have statutes requiring some degree of reference to the FTC Act for the
interpretation of state law. The court cited twelve of these statutes in Penney. 292-N.C. at 316,
233 S.E.2d at 898. (The court's citation of the Arizona statute should be changed to read ARIz.
REv. STAT. § 44-1522(B) (1967). The South Carolina statute has been recodified at S.C. CODE §
39-5-20(b) (1976).) Eight other states have a similar requirement: ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.545
(Cum. Supp. 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 106-1201(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977); HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-3
(1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:13 (Cum. Supp. 1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-3 (1969);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-2(4) (Cum. Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.920 (Cum.
Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-101(l) (1976).
At least one court has called into question the authority of the legislature to determine how
the courts shall construe a statute. Fitzgerald v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 46 111. App. 3d 526,
528, 361 N.E.2d 94, 96 (1977).
31. H. 1050, N.C. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess. (1977), was referred to the Senate Commit-
tee on State Government on June 7, 1977, and was reported favorably by that committee on
June 8, 1977. On June 9 the bill was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary 11, and on
June 17 that committee reported a committee substitute favorably. The committee substitute
did not contain the provision that instructed the courts to be guided by FTC interpretations. The
substitute was adopted on June 17, but on June 21 the bill was referred again to the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary II. On June 22, the committee reported favorably a second
committee substitute, which included for the first time the provision on debt collection prac-
tices. The second committee substitute was adopted by the Senate on June 22. On June 23 the
House concurred in the second Senate committee substitute, and the bill was adopted by the
House on June 24, 1977. The bill was ratified and became effective on June 27, 1977. INSTITUTE
OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 29.
32. In a case pending in the state of Washington, which does not have a statute requiring
the courts to be guided by FTC interpretations, the attorney general, in an action based on state
law, alleged that a violation of FTC regulations constituted an unfair trade practice under state
law. TRADE REG. REP. (CCH), Aug. 23, 1977, at 5. When the two statutes are identical, a court
might be persuaded to adopt that position, arguments to the contrary from legislative history
notwithstanding. In Pennsylvania, FTC interpretations have been incorporated into state law by
judicial decision. See Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 329 A.2d
812 (1974).
33. See 288 N.C. at 308, 218 S.E.2d at 345.
1978]
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II. EXCLUSION OF PROFESSIONS
While section 1 of the CPA broadened the scope of section 75-1. 1(a)
by adopting the language of the FTC Act, section 2 limited it by establishing
a new exemption to its application. 34 The amended version of section 75-
1. 1(b) defines commerce very broadly but explicitly excludes "professional
services rendered by a member of a learned profession" from the defini-
tion.3" This limiting definition by its terms applies only to section 75-1.1 ;36
consequently, while professionals are not subject to the prohibitions against
unfair competition and unfair trade practices contained in section 75-1.1 (a),
they are still subject to the prohibitions against combinations in restraint of
trade contained in section 75-1. 37
The exemption of professionals from section 75-1.1 applies only to the
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(c) (1975), which was in the original law adopted in 1969 and
was not affected by the CPA, provides a qualified exemption for the media:
Nothing in this section shall apply to acts done by the publisher, owner, agent, or
employee of a newspaper, periodical or radio or television station, or other advertising
medium in the publication or dissemination of an advertisement, when the owner,
agent or employee did not have knowledge of the false, misleading or deceptive
character of the advertisement and when the newspaper, periodical or radio or televi-
sion station, or other advertising medium did not have a direct financial interest in the
sale or distribution of the advertised product or service.
A similar exemption appears in UNIFORM DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 4.
35. "For purposes of this section, 'commerce' includes all business activities, however
denominated, but does not include professional services rendered by a member of a learned
profession." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977). The CPA does not define
"learned professions." The North Carolina Attorney General, however, has issued an Attorney
General's Opinion on the meaning of the exemption created by § 75-1.1(b). That Opinion
concludes that "[t]he phrase 'learned profession' applies to physicians, attorneys, clergy, and
related professions," on the ground that "[t]hese professions are characterized by the need of
unusual learning, the existence of confidential relations, and adherence to standards of ethics
higher than that in the marketplace." 47 N.C. Op. ATr'Y GEN. - (Nov. 16, 1977).
The "learned professions" traditionally are considered to include theology, law and
medicine. Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 6,7 (1976); see,
e.g., Georgia State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry v. Friedman's Jewelers, Inc., 183 Ga. 669,
673, 189 S.E. 238, 241 (1936).
36. The definition of "commerce" contained in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1,1(b) (Cum. Supp.
1977) is explicitly "[ffor purposes of this section." The term "section" refers only to § 75-1.1
and not generally to § 75-1 and any numerical subdivisions. The numbering system of the North
Carolina General Statutes uses the chapter number as the first part of each code section
number, then numbers the sections in each chapter "consecutively from 'one' on through the
end of the chapter." The number of each section consists of "the chapter number, a dash, and
the number of the section in the chapter." McMullan, Original Preface to NORTH CAROLINA
GENERAL STATUTES at ix (1969). This description indicates that each numbered subdivision
within a chapter is a section, noi a subsection. The Preface also indicates that the table at the
beginning of each chapter is to list "the titles of each section." Id. at x. The table at the
beginning of chapter 75 lists § 75-I with its title, then § 75-1.1 with its title, which indicates that §
75-1.1 is not a subsection of § 75-1. The language used by the legislature in the CPA also
indicates that numbers that include decimals are independent sections. In § 3 of the CPA the
legislature refers to "a new Section 75-15.2." Law of June 27, 1977, ch. 747, § 3, 1977 N.C.
Adv. Legis. Serv. 34 (Pamphlet No. 11, Pt. I). Despite the decimal, it is not referred to as a
"subsection."
37. Whether § 75-1. l(b) means that professionals are exempt from the prohibitions against
abusive debt collection practices is discussed in text accompanying notes 79-88 infra.
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rendering of "professional services"; it presumably provides no protection
against liability for unfair or deceptive practices in "commercial" activities
engaged in by professionals. For example, professionals would still be
subject to liability for deceptive advertising. The narrow language of the
exemption may indicate an intention merely to preclude the possibility of
professional malpractice suits under section 75-1.1.38
The legislative history of the CPA provides no indication of the legisla-
tive intent behind the exemption of professionals created by section 75-
1.1(b). The original version of the legislation contained a verybroad,
unqualified definition of "commerce, ' 39 but the definition was revised and
limited so as to exempt professionals before the final version was enacted.' 0
Neither does the text of the Act itself offer any insight into the rationale
supporting such an exception. 41 The primary consequence of the exemption
38. This interpretation is reflected in a recent North Carolina Attorney General's Opinion:
While the [Senate Judiciary II] Committee recognized that rendering of legal services
was not "commerce" as that term is usually defined, it wished to make certain that
poor performance by an attorney on behalf of his client could not be characterized as
an unfair commercial practice.
In summary, the exclusion of professional services was added to G.S. 75-1. 1(b) in
order to clarify the intent of the legislature to reach only commercial activities and not
activities of a strictly professional nature.
N.C. Op. Arr'y GEN., supra note 35. For a helpful discussion of the relationship of unfair
trade practice law to professional malpractice, see Comment, The Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices-Consumer Protection Act: Application to Professional Malpractice, 8 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 763 (1977).
39. Section 2 of the original version of H. 1050, N.C. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess. (1977),
proposed that § 75-1.1(b) be rewritten to read as follows: "For purposes of this section,
'commerce' is a term of the largest import, and includes all business activities, however
denominated. This section shall be liberally construed to prevent unfair, unethical, deceptive,
fraudulent, oppressive, unscrupulous, and otherwise illegal acts or practices of every type and
description." The first sentence of this version appears to have been adapted from the language
of the United States Supreme Court in Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875): "Commerce is a
term of the largest import. It comprehends intercourse for the purposes of trade in any and all
its forms .... ." Id. at 280. This case was cited to the North Carolina Supreme Court by the
attorney general in Penney. See New Brief for the State at 8, State ex rel. Edmisten v. J. C.
Penney Co., 292 N.C. 311, 233 S.E.2d 895 (1977).
40. The original provision was eliminated in the first committee substitute. See note 31
supra. It was replaced by the language that appears in the CPA. See note 35 supra.
41. One possible rationale is that the professional codes of ethics provide adequate
regulation and that further regulation is unnecessary. The FTC Act, for example, while it does
not exempt professionals, does contain exemptions for banks and several other industries
subject to other government regulation. See note 43 infra. An explicit statutory provision such
as § 75-1.1(b) is probably necessary if professionals are to be excluded on this basis. See
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), in which the United States Supreme Court
rejected the argument that Congress did not intend to include the professions within the term
"trade or commerce" for purposes of the Sherman Act. The Court said: "Congress intended to
strike as broadly as it could in § I of the Sherman Act, and to read into it so wide an exemption
as that urged on us would be at odds with that purpose." Id. at 787. In Goldfarb the Court also
found that the exchange of a professional service-in that case the examination of a land title-
for money was "commerce." Id. It is clear then that without a statutory exclusion the
1978]
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is that members of professions who engage in unfair or deceptive practices
in the course of rendering professional services will not be subjeci to the
enforcement and remedial provisions42 that are otherwise available against
those who violate section 75-1.1(a).4 3
While the exemption for professionals may prove to be of little practi-
cal consequence, it may be subject to judicial attack. For example, a person
who is injured by deceptive practices by a member of a profession may seek
to have the exemption struck down as an unconstitutional denial of equal
protection, on the ground that the classification established in the statute is
"not based upon a justifiable distinction." The fact that such other fields
as banking and insurance are not exempt from section 75-1. 1(a), although
they are subject to extensive regulation, lends credence to this argument.45
rendering of professional services would have been within even the limited scope of "trade or
commerce" that was recognized by the court in Penney.
42. These provisions include: (1) The attorney general may seek mandatory court orders
to compel compliance with chapter 75 (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-14 (1975)); (2) in any such action,
the court may order restitution or cancellation of a contract (Id. § 75-15.1); (3) the attorney
general may seek civil penalties of up to five thousand dollars per violation (Id. § 75-15.2 (Cum.
Supp. 1977)); (4) an injured party may bring a private action seeking treble damages (Id. § 75-
16); and (5) in a private civil action the injured party may also seek recovery of attorneys' fees
(Id. § 75-16.1 (1975)).
43. A consumer would have no practical remedy against an offending professional under
the FTC Act. He could not bring an action based on the FTC Act, as there is currently no
general right of private action under that Act. See note 131 infra. A consumer also would be
unlikely to benefit from the consumer redress provisions of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b)
(Supp. V 1975), as the FTC generally has not acted against professionals in the area of unfair
trade practices.
The FTC has acted against professionals for restraining competition. For example, in
September 1977 the FTC charged that the advertising restrictions of the American Medical
Association restrain competition. In re American Medical Ass'n, No. 9064 (FTC, filed Sept. 7,
1977); see 830 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), Sept. 15, 1977, at A-l I, -12.
Section 5(a)(2) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975), currently exempts
banks, common carriers, air carriers and entities subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act.
Section 12 of H.R. 3816, 95th Cong., ist Sess. (1977), H.R. REP. No. 339, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.
1 (1977), currently pending in the United States Congress, would extend this exemption to
savings and loan institutions. Not-for-profit corporations that engage in business for only
charitable purposes have been held to be exempt from the FTC Act by implication. See
Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. FTC, 405 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1969). Section 15(a)(1) of the
originally introduced version of H.R. 3816 contained a revised definition of "corporation" that
would have enabled the FTC to take action against not-for-profit corporations, but that
provision was deleted in committee. See H.R. REP. No. 339, supra at 53-54, 120.
The ethics codes of the various professions provide no remedies for the consumer, as they
merely establish standards of behavior. See, e.g., ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(adopted in North Carolina in 1974 with modifications, pursuant to a resolution of the North
Carolina State Bar, 283 N.C. 783 (1973), reprinted in 4A N.C. GEN. STAT. app. VII (Cum. Supp.
1977)). Only the governing body of the particular profession involved can take action against a
member for violating the code. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-23 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (Council
of the North Carolina State Bar may disbar attorneys); id. § 90-14 (North Carolina Board of
Medical Examiners may rescind doctors' licenses). Professionals, of course, are subject to suits
at common law, and, if an attorney is found to have committed fraudulent practices, the injured
party must be awarded double damages. Id. § 84-13 (1975).
44. State v. Glidden Co., 228 N.C. 664, 668, 46 S.E.2d 860, 862 (1948).
45. The North Carolina appellate courts have never considered an equal protection claim
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II. CIVIL PENALTIES
Section 3 of the CPA created an important new enforcement tool46 for
the attorney general in civil actions against violators of section 75-1.1. This
provision, section 75-15.2, 47 permits the attorney general to recover up to
five thousand dollars in civil penalties for knowing violations of section 75-
1.1. In providing for civil penalties, North Carolina has joined twenty-nine
other jurisdictions48 that have statutes authorizing such penalties for initial
violations. 49 Prior to the enactment of this section, the only action that the
pertaining to the learned professions, but on several occasions the North Carolina Supreme
Court has found that laws creating unjustifiable distinctions between various types of commer-
cial enterprises were unconstitutional denials of equal protection. See, e.g., State v.
Greenwood, 280 N.C. 651, 187 S.E.2d 8 (1972) (invalidating Sunday closing ordinance that
applied only to pool halls); Cheek v. City of Charlotte, 273 N.C. 293, 160 S.E.2d 18 (1968)
(invalidating ordinance prohibiting heterosexual massages that did not apply to barber shops or
hospitals but did apply to massage parlors); State v. Glidden Co., 228 N.C. 664, 46 S.E.2d 860
(1948) (invalidating water pollution law that applied only to corporations chartered after March
4, 1915). The noncommercial character of the learned professions might be considered to
constitute a "rational basis" for a statutory exemption for professional activity. The United
States Supreme Court's decision in Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (19771, however, implies
that attorneys, at least, are engaged in commerce. See id. at 371-72. After Bates, therefore,
there may no longer be a "rational basis.' for exempting professional activities from statutes
that apply generally to commercial activities.
46. See note 42 supra for a complete list of remedies available for violations of chapter 75.
47. In any suit instituted by the At;orney General, in which the defendant is found to
have violated G.S. 75-1.1 and the acts or practices which constituted the violation
were, when committed, specifically prohibited by a court order or knowingly violative
of a statute, the court may, in its discretion, impose a civil penalty against the
defendant [of up to] five thousand dollars ($5,000) for each violation. In determining
the amount of the civil penalty, the court shall consider all relevant circumstances,
including, but not limited to, the extent of the harm caused by the conduct constituting
a violation, the nature and persistence of such conduct, the length of time over which
the conduct occurred, the assets, liabilities, and net worth of the person, whether
corporate or individual, and any corrective action taken by the defendant. Any penalty
so assessed shall be paid to the General Fund of the State of North Carolina.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-15.2 (Cum. Supp. 1977). The phrase in brackets--"of up to"-does not
appear in the ratified bill, but that is apparently a typographical error, as all previous versions of
the bill, including the version enacted by the Senate and the House, did include that phrase.
48. Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii,
Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Caroli-
na, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin impose civil penalties.
OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FACT SHEET: STATE LEGISLA-
TION TO COMBAT UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES (rev. ed. July 1977) [hereinafter cited as FACT
SHEET]; see, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 49-15-9 (Cum. Supp. 1975); S.C. CODE § 3915-110(a)
(1976); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 17.47(c) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1976-1977).The
Fact Sheet is a very useful summary of state unfair trade practice law. It includes lists ot
jurisdictions whose statutes provide for (1) restitution to consumers (47 jurisdictions), (2) civil
penalties for initial violations (29 jurisdictions), (3) class actions by consumers (16 juris-
dictions), (4) private actions by consumers (42 jurisdictions) and (5) rules and regulations to
implement statutes similar to the FTC Act (31 jurisdictions). FACT SHEET, supra. The July 1977
edition of the Fact Sheet does not reflect the new North Carolina legislation. (Copies of the
Fact Sheet may be obtained from Mr. Gale P. Gotschall, Counsel for Federal-State Coopera-
tion, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C. 20580.)
49. The FTC Act provides for a civil penalty of "not more than $ 10,000" for a violation of
an FTC order. 15 U.S.C. § 45(l) (Supp. V 1975). The 1975 amendments added a new provision
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attorney general could take against a violator of section 75-1.1 was to seek
equitable relief under sections 75-1450 and 75-15.1.51
The section 75-15.2 civil penalty will be available only in those cases
in which the conduct constituting the violation was "specifically prohibited
by a court order or knowingly violative of a statute.'"52 Two questions arise
in connection with this provision. First, it is not clear from the language of
the statute whether it refers to court orders previously entered against the
defendant in the attorney general's civil action or is intended to reach
conduct that has been prohibited previously by a court order against any
person. The FTC Act, by way of analogy, provides that "any person" who
engages in conduct that has been prohibited by a cease and desist order with
knowledge that the conduct is unlawful may be subject to a civil penalty, 53
and the text of the FTC Act itself and its legislative history make it clear that
the cease and desist order need not have been issued against the party to the
civil action.54
The second question that arises in connection with the type of conduct
that is subject to a civil penalty is the meaning of the word "knowingly." 55
Here the language of the FTC Act may again be instructive. The FTC Act
provides for civil penalties for the violation of an FTC rule when the unfair
or deceptive act involved is committed "with actual knowledge or knowl-
edge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances that such act is
unfair or deceptive and is prohibited by such rule." 56 This language and the
FTC's interpretations of it could provide some guidance to the North
Carolina courts in applying the statutory requirement that the conduct be
imposing a similar penalty on anyone who knowingly violates an FTC rule, id. § 45 (m)(1)(A),
and on anyone who knowingly engages in conduct prohibited by a cease and desist order, id. §
45(m)(l)(B). The interpretation and application of these provisions may provide some guidance
as to how § 75-15.2 is to be applied.
50. If it shall become necessary to do so, the Attorney General may prosecute civil
actions in the name of the State on relation of the Attorney General to obtain a
mandatory order, including (but not limited to) permanent or temporary injunctions
and temporary restraining orders, to carry out the provisions of this Chapter, and the
venue shall be in any county as selected by the Attorney General.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-14 (1975).
51. In any suit instituted by the Attorney General to enjoin a practice alleged to
violate G.S. 75-1.1, the presiding judge may, upon a final determination of the cause,
order the restoration of any moneys or property and the cancellation of any contract
obtained by any defendant as a result of such violation.
Id. § 75-15.1.
52. Id. § 75-15.2 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1975).
54. "While the defendant in such an action need not have been a respondent in a
proceeding before the Commission, actual knowledge that the act or practice is a violation of
the FTC Act is required." S. REP. No. 1408, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 40, reprlinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7755, 7772.
55. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
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"knowingly violative of a statute." 57
While section 75-15.2 on its face provides for a maximum penalty of
five thousand dollars, 58 the penalty actually imposed can be substantially
greater than that. Section 75-8 provides that, when a violation is continuous,
each week during which it continues constitutes a separate offense. 59 The
FTC Act has comparable provisions under which each day of a continuing
violation of a rule or a cease and desist order constitutes a separate offense,60
and it has been held that it is the purpose o*f such a provision to assure that
individuals or corporations who fail to do some act that they are specifically
required to do by the FTC may be fined more than the amount prescribed by
the statute. 6' Section 75-8, if properly invoked by the attorney general and
vigorously applied by the courts, can thus become a very effective deterrent
to violations of chapter 75.62
The courts, of course, are not bound to impose the maximum penalty,
but the second sentence of section 75-15.2 spells out very clearly the
particular factors that they must consider in determining the penalty. 63 These
guidelines, which are quite similar to those spelled out in the FTC Act,6 4
may serve to encourage uniformity in the penalties imposed. They may also
provide a basis for appeal on some ground other than simple abuse of
discretion, which is notoriously difficult to establish. 65
IV. DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES
Although the amendment of section 75-1.1 (a) was unquestionably a
57. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
58. See note 47 supra.
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-8 (1975).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 45(1), (m)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1975).
61. United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 354 F. Supp. 521, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974).
62. The FTC only recently brought its first penalty suits under 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(l)(B)
(Supp. V 1975), which was added to the FTC Act in 1975 as part of the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat.
2183 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1975)). To initiate these suits the FTC
first sent certified letters to the offending corporations, informing them that they were in
violation and citing supporting authorities for the allegation. When the violations continued, the
FTC filed penalty suits under 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(l)(B) (Supp. V 1975) on the ground of knowing
violations. Three of the five companies have agreed to settlements. See 815 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), May 27, 1977, at A-14, -15. This appears to be a practical and
effective enforcement technique that could be employed by the attorney general under § 75-
15.2.
63. See note 47 supra.
64. "In determining the amount of such a civil penalty, the court shall take into account
the degree of culpability, any history of prior such conduct, ability to pay, effect on ability to
continue to do business, and such other matters as justice may require." 15 U.S.C. §
45(m)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1975).
65. See Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRA-
CUSE L. REV. 635, 643-60 (1971).
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legislative response to the North Carolina Supreme Court's narrow construc-
tion of that section in Penney,66 the legislature's most direct response to the
Penney decision appears in section 4 of the CPA. Section 4 adds a new
article67 to chapter 75 for the purpose of regulating certain debt collection
activities. It is therefore now generally irrelevant whether the court con-
siders debt collection to be included in the term "commerce. "68 However,
while these new debt collection provisions, sections 75-50 to 75-56, prohibit
a broad range of offensive collection practices, 69 they do not apply to all
debt collectors, and the remedies available under them are limited.
A. Application
As the prohibitions of the new debt collection provisions are directed
only against "debt collectors," the statutory definition of "debt collector"
determines the applicability of the provisions: " 'Debt collector' means any
person engaging, directly or indirectly, in debt collection from a consumer
except those persons subject to the provisions of Article 9, Chapter 66 of the
General Statutes. "70 Under this definition, the applicability of this part of
the Act depends not only on the identity of the collector but also on the
identity of the debtor.
First, to come within the definition, the debt collector must be trying to
collect from a debtor who is a consumer. 71 A consumer, in turn, is defined
as "any natural person who has incurred a debt or alleged debt for personal,
family, household or agricultural purposes." 72 Therefore, if the debtor is a
66. See text accompanying notes 16-32 supra.
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-50 to -56 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
68. The scope of the term "commerce" would still be relevant if the attorney general
should attempt to prosecute debt collection agencies under § 75-1.1(a). See note 112 infra.
69. See text accompanying notes 89-106 infra.
70. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-50(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
71. Id.
72. Id. § 75-50(l). This definition is similar to the definition of "consumer goods" in the
Uniform Commercial Code: "Goods are (1) 'consumer goods' if they are used or bought for use
primarily for personal, family or household purposes ...." U.C.C, § 9-109(l). The determi-
nation whether the debtor is a consumer under this type of definition will depend on the
particular purpose for which he incurred the debt, not on the general nature of the goods or
services purchased. It may therefore be possible for a creditor to avoid liability under the debt
collection provisions of the CPA by establishing that the debtor incurred the debt for a
particular "commercial" purpose, even though the goods or services may generally be con-
sidered to be of a "personal" nature. The Magnuson-Moss Act eliminates this possibility by
defining "consumer product" as one that is "normally used for personal, family, or household
purposes," 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1) (Supp. V 1975) (emphasis added), thus focusing more directly
on the product itself and not the purchaser. The FTC has interpreted this section of the
Magnuson-Moss Act as follows: "[Tihe use to which a product is put by any individual buyer is
not determinative. For example, products such as automobiles and typewriters which are used
for both personal and commercial pruposes come within the definition of consumer product."
Interpretations of Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 42 Fed. Reg. 36,115 (1975) (to be codified in
16 C.F.R. § 700.1(a)). Thus, under the Magnuson-Moss Act, a car is always a consumer
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corporation or if the debtor is a natural person who incurred the debt for
commercial purposes, the party attempting to collect such a debt is not a
"debt collector" for purposes of the debt collection provisions and is not
subject to their prohibitions.
Second, to come within the definition, the debt collector must be
someone who is not covered by article 9 of chapter 66,71 a collection agency
licensing and bonding statute74 which applies basically to persons or firms
whose business it is to collect claims owed to their clients. 75 Anyone not
coming within the statutory definition of collection agency or anyone specif-
ically excluded76 from that definition is not subject to article 9 of chapter 66
and therefore is subject to sections 75-50 to 75-56. 77
Among those excluded from the definition of collection agency in
section 66-42 and therefore included in the definition of debt collector in
section 75-50(3) are "[r]egular employees of a single creditor.''78 Thus,
unquestionably, the prohibitions of the debt collection provisions will apply
to companies like J.C. Penney that act as debt collectors only with respect to
their own accounts. The definition of collection agency in section 66-42 also
specifically excludes "[a]ttorneys-at-law handling claims and collections in
product, but, under § 75-50(l) of the North Carolina General Statutes, the purchaser of a car
may or may not be a consumer, depending on the purpose for which he purchases the car.
Section 75-50 does not specify who has the burden of proving the consumer character of the
debtor. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(d) (1975) provides that the party claiming to be exempt from
that section bears the burden of proof with respect to the claim of exemption. If that require-
ment were applied by analogy to the debt collection provisions, then a debt collector who
claimed to be beyond the scope of the law because the debtor was not a "'consumer" would
have the burden of proof on the issue whether the debtor was a consumer or not. However, if §
75-1.1(d) is not applied by analogy, the burden probably would be on the debtor-plaintiff to
establish that he had incurred the debt for personal rather than commercial purposes, as the
plaintiff in a civil action generally must prove all the elements of his claim.
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-50(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977). Article 9 of chapter 66 appears at id.
88 66-41 to -49 (1975).
74. Id. §§ 66-41 to -42.1 (1975).
75. Id. § 66.42.
76. Among those excluded from the statutory definition of "collection agency" are banks,
licensed real estate brokers, factoring firms and attorneys. Id.
77. Fourteen jurisdictions have statutes that regulate debt collection practices by all debt
collectors, including collection agencies: D.C. CODE § 28-3814 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
559.55-.78 (Harrison 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, §§ 26211-2621 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp.
1977); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-18-13-1 to -6 (Burns 1975); IOWA CODE ANN. 88 537.6201-.6203,
.7101-.7103 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3562 (West Cum. Supp.
1977); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. 88 14-201 to -204 (1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 358-C:1-:4
(Cum. Supp. 1975), as amended by Law of June 27, 1977, ch. 308, 1977 N.H. Laws -; N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 49-15-1 to -18 (Cum. Supp. 1975); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW 88 600-603 (McKinney
Cum. Supp. 1976-1977); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.605-.656 (1977); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
arts. 5069-11.01 to .11 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1976-1977); W. VA. CODE §§ 46A-2-122 to -129
(1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. 88 427.010-.105 (West 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
Some of these statutes apply only to the collection of debts that were incurred in consumer
transactions. See, e.g., id.
78. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-42 (1975).
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their own name," 79 but whether attorneys are therefore subject to the
prohibitions of sections 75-50 tq 75-56 is not entirely clear.A0 On the one
hand, attorneys, as members of a learned profession, are excluded from the
definition of "commerce" in section 75-1.1(b)8 I and therefore are not
subject to the general provisions of section 75-1.1(a). If the provisions on
debt collection practices are construed to be merely a clarification of what
behavior is prohibited by section 75-1.1(a), then the exclusion of profes-
sionals would also apply to the debt collection provisions. This construction
can be supported by reference to the first sentence of section 75-56,82 which
implies that the debt collection provisions are merely a clarification of
section 75-1.1 and not independent provisions. On the other hand, the
definition of commerce that excludes professionals8 3 applies only to "this
section," that is, section 75-1.1, and not to chapter 75 in general. 84 The
legislative history of the CPA supports the view that the debt collection
provisions should be construed independently of section 75-1.1(b), as the
exclusion of professionals8 5 and the debt collection provisions 86 were added
to the Act at different stages of the legislative process.8 7 Thus, a violation of
sections 75-50 to 75-56 should be considered separately from aviolation of
section 75-1.1 and should not be subject to the limitations that apply only to
the latter section.8 8
79. Id.
80. The universal pattern in the statutes of other states that regulate collection activities of
nonagency collectors is to include professionals in the coverage of the statutes. See statutes
cited note 77 supra. Statutes that apply specifically to collection agencies without exception
exclude attorneys from the definition of collection agency. Id.
The MODEL CONSUMER DEBT COLLECTION FAIR PRACTICES ACT, reprinted in 80 Com. L.J.
184 (1975), was approved by the Board of Governors of the American Bar Association in April
1976 and promulgated by'the National Conference of Lawyers and Collection Agencies. This
Act defines "debt collector" as "any person engaging, directly or indirectly, in debt collection
from a consumer." Id. § L.G (emphasis added).
The MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT ACT 1973 (published by the National Consumer Law
Center, Boston, Mass.) is even more explicit. Section 6.102(2) of that Act provides that debt
collector "means any person engaging . . . in enforcing claims, and includes creditors...
when they are so acting." Id. § 6.102(2).
81. See note 35 supra.
82. "The specific and general provisions of this Article shall exclusively constitute the
unfair or deceptive acts or practices proscribed by G.S. 75-1.1 in the area of commerce
regulated by this Article." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-56 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
83. See note 36 supra.
84. This limited application of the exception was noted in an early news item relating to
the CPA. See 822 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), July 14, 1977, at D-2. See note 36
supra for a discussion of the meaning of "section."
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
86. Id. §§ 75-50 to -56.
87. Section 75-1.1(b), which excludes professionals from the definition of "commerce,"
was added to H. 1050, N.C. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess. (1977), in the first committee substi-
tute. Sections 75-50 to -56, relating to debt collection practices, first appeared in the second
committee substitute. See note 31 supra.
88. See notes 35 & 36 supra.
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B. Prohibited Activities
The CPA specifies five types of prohibited debt collection activities:
threats and coercion, 9 harassment, 9 unreasonable publication, 91 deceptive
representation 92 and unconscionable means. 93 Following the general
prohibition of each type of activity, there is a nonexclusive list of specifical-
ly prohibited conduct of that type. 9
4
89. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-51 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
90. Id. § 75-52.
91. Id. § 75-53.
92. Id. § 75-54.
93. Id. § 75-55. Several of the provisions of 88 75-51 to -56 pertain to activities that were
already prohibited by law. For example, under the general heading of "[d]eceptive representa-
tion," the Act prohibits a debt collector from "[u]sing or distributing or selling any written
communication which simulates or is falsely represented to be a document authorized, issued,
or approved by a court, an official, or any other legally constituted or authorized authority, or
which creates a false impression about its source." Id. § 75-54(5). This provision resembles a
previously existing statute that makes it unlawful to simulate court process in connection with
the collection of a claim, demand or account. See id. § 14-118.1 (1969). Use of simulated official
federal forms is also prohibited under federal law. 18 U.S.C. § 712 (Supp. V 1975). The North
Carolina statute, § 75-54(5), has been used successfully against offending creditors. For exam-
ple, in May 1977 a North Carolina landlord was found guilty of violating this section and was
given a 30-day suspended sentence and a $100 fine. North Carolina v. Watts, No. 77CRS23202
(Mecklenburg County Dist. Ct., filed May 19, 1977), appealfiled (Mecklenburg County Super.
Ct. May 19, 1977).
In this case defendant landlord had issued a notarized notice to a tenant entitled "State of
North Carolina, County of Mecklenburg NOTICE TO VACATE," and the district court found
that the language and the notary seal were sufficient to imply that the notice was an official legal
document. In the district court the tenant testified that he thought the notice had come from the
state. See Simulation Statute Asserted, N.C. LEGAL SERVICES NEWSLETTER, June 1977, at 1.
For another example of this type of document, see Tester v. National Credit Exch., Inc., 299
So. 2d 46, 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
94. The structure and content of these sections is very similar to the MODEL CONSUMER
DEBT COLLECTION FAIR PRACTICES ACT, reprinted in 80 COM. L.J. 184 (1975); see note 80 supra.
Other statutory patterns that may be used in order to regulate debt collection practices include:
(1) MODEL ACT TO LICENSE AND REGULATE COLLECTION AGENCIES, reprinted in 70 CoM. L.J. 38
(1965) (promulgated by the National Conference of Lawyers and Collection Agencies); (2)
MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT ACT 1973, §§ 6.101-.207 (published by the National Consumer Law
Center, Boston, Mass., and essentially a new version of the Center's NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT
(1st final draft, 1970)); (3) MODEL CONSUMER PROTECTION ORDINANCE § 2-404(c), reprinted in C.
RHYNE & W. RHYNE, CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW AND THE MUNICIPALITY 95 app. A (1975); (4)
UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT (especially Comments to §§ 2(5), 3(a), 4(a), (b),
relating to the application of this Act to debt collection practices); and (5) UNIFORM DECEPTIVE
TRADE PRACTICES ACT (especially § 2(a)(12), a "catch-all" provision that has been held to be
broad enough to apply to financing practices, Garland v. Mobil Oil Corp., 340 F. Supp. 1095
(N.D. Ill. 1972) (interpreting the Illinois Deceptive Trade Practices Act that is based on the
UNIFORM ACT)). See generally Scott & Strickland, Abusive Debt Collection-A Model Statute
for Virginia, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 567 (1974); Comment, Recent Statutes Regulating Debt
Collection, or Nunc, de Minimis Curat Lex, 14 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 1274 (1973);
Comment, Debt Collection Practices: The Need for Comprehensive Legislation, 15 DUQ. L.
REV. 97 (1976); Comment, Proposals for Limiting Collection Practices: New Hope for the
Debtor in Default, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 685 (1977).
For examples of common abusive practices, see the dissenting opinion of Justice Huskins
in Penney, 292 N.C. at 321-23, 233 S.E.2d at 901-02, in which he describes some of the activities
that led the attorney general to file suit against J.C. Penney.
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. One of the particularly significant provisions under the general heading
of "[t]hreats and coercion" prohibits a debt collector from "[r]epresenting
that nonpayment of an alleged debt may result in the seizure, garnishment,
attachment, or sale of any prop erty or wages unless such action is in fact
contemplated by the debt collector and permitted by law." 95 As garnishment
of future wages is not available to creditors in North Carolina,96 most threats
of garnishment, unless specifically limited to past wages, would be a
violation of the Act.
97
Under the general heading of "[h]arassment," one of the listed pro-
hibited activities is "[p]lacing telephone calls or attempting to communicate
with any person, contrary to his instructions, at his place of employment,
unless the debt collector does not have a telephone number where the
consumer can be reached during the consumer's nonworking hours." 98 Of
the fourteen affidavits submitted by the attorney general to support the suit
against J.C. Penney Company, thirteen stated that the company had con-
tacted the consumer at his place of employment or had contacted or
threatened to contact the consumer's employer or both. 9 Contacting the
employer in order to put pressure on the debtor is one of the most common
types of collection harassment.l°0 As section 75-52(4) applies to calls to
95. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-51(6) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
96. Because of statutory and judicial limitations, prospective wage garnishment is avail-
able in North Carolina only in child support cases. See generally Note, Remedies-Domestic
Relations: Garnishment for Child Support, 56 N.C.L. REv. 169 (1978).
The unavailability of wage garnishment, while obviously a direct benefit to the debtor, may
actually work to his disadvantage in the area of debt collection activities. Research has shown
that the technologically efficient methods of collecting on debts, in descending order of
efficiency, are (1) wage garnishment, (2) debtor harassment and (3) execution on noncxempt
property. If wage garnishment is not an available method of collection, debtor harassment
becomes the economically efficient method. Therefore, where wage garnishment is not avail-
able, harassment is more likely to occur. Anderson, Coercive Collection and Exempt Property in
Texas: A Debtor's Paradise or a Living Hell?, 13 Hous. L. REv. 84, 96-97 (1975). See also D.
CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 182 table 10. 1 (1974).
Even when garnishment is available, it may not be the "economiqally efficient" method of
collection it once was. In a series of cases in recent years, the United States Supreme Court has
imposed certain due process requirements on creditor remedies. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972) (replevin); Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972) (confession of judgment);
Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (garnishment). See generally, Comment,
Debt Collection Practices: The Need for Comprehensive Legislation, supra note 94. Since 1970,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677 (1970) has also limited the amount of wages that can be garnished.
97. Cf. Inter-Continental Servs. Corp., 86 F.T.C. 1098, 1103 (1975) (FTC issued cease and
desist order prohibiting debt collector from falsely representing that failure to pay would result
in garnishment or attachment).
98. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-52(4) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
99. Affidavits appear in Record at 8-45, State ex rel. Edmisten v. I.C. Penney Co., 30
N.C. App. 368, 227 S.E.2d 141 (1976). See also 292 N.C. at 321-23, 233 S.E.2d at 901-02
(Huskins, J., dissenting).
100. See D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 96, at 182 table 10.1. The Penney affidavits appear to
indicate that this tactic is used frequently in North Carolina despite the general unavailability of
wage garnishment. See generally note 96 supra.
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"any person," it is broad enough to prohibit calls to the consumer himself at
his place of employment as well as calls to the consumer's employer.
Unauthorized contact with the consumer's employer would also violate
section 75-53(1), under the general heading of "[u]nreasonable pub-
lication," which prohibits "[a]ny communication with any person other
than the debtor or his attorney, except . . . [w]ith the written permission of
the debtor or his attorney." 101
Two of the provisions under the general heading of "[u]nconscionable
means" are particularly significant. First, the waiver prohibition contained
in section 75-55(1) prohibits a debt collector from "[s]eeking or obtaining
a waiver of any legal rights of the debtor without disclosing the nature
and consequences of such. . . waiver and the fact that the consumer is not
legally obligated to make such . . . waiver.""1 2 This provision will prove
helpful in actions against collectors who mislead consumers as to the
"nature and consequences" of the waiver, but problems of proof are likely
to arise in cases in which the consumer alleges that the collector failed to
make the proper disclosures. Even more serious problems will arise in those
cases in which the collector in fact makes the required disclosures but the
consumer does not understand them. While an absolute prohibition of
waiver may not be necessary or even desirable,10 3 the statute would offer
much more protection for consumers if it provided more specific limitations
on the seeking of waivers. 104
The other significant provision of section 75-55 is subsection (4),
which prohibits "[b]ringing suit against the debtor in a county other than
that in which the debt was incurred or in which the debtor resides if the
distances and amounts involved would make it impractical for the debtor to
defend the claim." 105 The practice of some creditors of bringing suits in
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-53(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977). The FTC has ordered collectors not
to contact consumers' employers. See, e.g., Inter-Continental Servs. Corp., 86 F.T.C. 1098,
1103-04 (1975).
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-55(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
103. For example, there may be occasions when it would be advantageous to both the
consumer and the creditor to waive some of their legal rights in order to settle a disputed claim.
104. Several jurisdictions include absolute waiver prohibitions in their statutes on unfair
trade practices. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.542 (Cum. Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5,
§ 214 (Supp. 1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:101 (Supp. 1975); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. tit. 2, § 17.42 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1976-1977). For a discussion of a potential problem
created by the Texas waiver provision, see Note, Implied Warranties: Can They Still Be Waived
in Texas, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 440 (1974).
The FTC has proposed that the obtaining of certain waivers, including, for example, a
"waiver. . .of an exemption from attachment. . . on real or personal property," be deemed
an unfair act or practice under § 5 of the FTC Act. Proposed Trade Regulation Rule-Credit
Practices, 40 Fed. Reg. 16,347 (1975) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 444.2).
105. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-55(4) (Cum. Supp. 1977). In related action, the General Assem-
bly this year amended chapter I of the General Statutes to add a new section relating to venue in
certain actions to recover a deficiency:
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inconvenient forums can be particularly oppressive for consumers. Al-
though the practice might have been attacked under section 75-1.1 as an
unfair trade practice, 1°6 the deterrent value of the explicit prohibition in
section 75-55(4) should give added protection to the consumer.
C. Remedies
While the CPA is broad enough to reach all debt collectors except
collection agencies10 7 and perhaps members of the learned professions, 10 8
and while the list of prohibited activities is comprehensive enough to reach
almost any undesirable collection practices, 1°9 the remedies available for
violations of the Act are limited. The first sentence of section 75-56
provides that, "in the area of commerce regulated by this Article," 110 the
provisions of sections 75-50 to 75-56 "exclusively constitute the unfair or
deceptive acts or practices proscribed by G.S. 75-1.1."111 The apparent
effect of this provision is to prevent an action directly under the general
provisions of section 75-1.1 against any activity that is within the ambit of
the debt collection provisions. 112 As there is virtually no offensive collection
practice that would not be within either the general or specific prohibitions
of sections 75-50 to 75-56, the practical effect of the first sentence of section
75-56 is to ensure that any action against nonagency debt collectors is
subject to the limitations on remedies imposed by the subsequent portion of
section 75-56.113
Subject to the power of the court to change the place of trial as provided by law,
actions to recover a deficiency, which remains owing on a debt after secured personal
property has been sold to partially satisfy the debt, must be brought in the county in
which the debtor or debtor's agent resides or in the county where the loan was
negotiated.
Id. § 1-76.1.
106. The FTC has taken action under § 5 of the FTC Act against firms that sue consumers
in distant forums. See, e.g., Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1976).
107. See text accompanying notes 70-77 supra.
108. See text accompanying notes 79-88 supra.
109. See text accompanying notes 89-106 supra.
110. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-56 (Cum. Supp. 1977). The "area of commerce regulated by this
Article" is not defined in the statute. Based on the definitions in § 75-50, the phrase presumably
refers to debt collection from a consumer by any person not subject to the provisions of article
9 of chapter 66. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
111. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-56 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
112. See text accompanying notes 89-106 supra. As the debt collection practices of collec-
tion agencies are regulated under N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-41 to -49 (1975) and are not regulated
by §§ 75-50 to -56, it appears that an action could be brought under § 75-1.1 against a collection
agency. In commenting on the regulation of collection agencies in North Carolina, a representa-
tive of the Consumer Protection Section in the North Carolina Department of Justice has
suggested the possibility of a suit under § 75-1. 1: "[I]f the actions of a collection agency appear
sufficiently deleterious to the public, and are not fully corrected by action of the North Carolina
regulators, we will take such action-either under the Federal Act, or generally under G.S. 75-
1.1." Letter to the author from Alan S. Hirsch, Ass't Att'y Gen., Consumer Protection
Section, N.C. Dep't of Justice (Oct. 20, 1977) (emphasis added) (copy on file in office of North
Carolina Law Review).
113. One commentator, discussing Texas law, states that under the Texas statute it may be
[Vol. 56
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Section 75-56114 imposes three limitations on the remedies available for
violations of the debt collection provisions. The first limitation provides that
"civil penalties in excess of one thousand dollars ($1,000) shall not be
imposed. . . for any violation under this Article. ... 115 This limitation
apparently refers to the civil penalties that are available under section 75-
15.2116 in an action brought by the attorney general and that otherwise may
be impoed up to a maximum amount of five thousand dollars.117 However,
as section 75-8 provides that each week of a continuing violation shall
constitute a separate offense,I s the actual penalty imposed may exceed one
thousand dollars when the violation is continuing.' 19 This limitation on the
amount of civil penalties that may be imposed reduces the deterrent effect of
a civil action, but vigorous application of the continuing violation provision
of section 75-8 in appropriate cases could help to discourage abusive
practices. 120
The second limitation imposed by section 75-56 prohibits the award of
treble damages, which are otherwise available under section 75-16.121 The
negative implication of this limitation is that, while treble damages are not
possible to proceed under the general unfair trade practices law rather than under the collection
practices law and therefore to have recourse to more stringent penalties. See Comment, The
Texas Debt Collection Practices Act: Relief for the Harassed Debtor?, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 773,
787 (1977). The first sentence of § 75-56 appears to be intended to cut off that possibility in
North Carolina.
114. Notwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 75-15.2, G.S. 75-16, and G.S. 75-16.1,
civil penalties in excess of one thousand dollars ($1,000) shall not be imposed, nor shall
damages be trebled or attorney's fees assessed for any violation under this Article nor
shall the provisions of this Article be construed to confer any right of private action
not already available at common law or by hneans of other specific statutory authoriza-
tion.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-56 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
115. Id.
116. See id. Section 75-15.2 is mentioned particularly in the introductory disclaimer clause
of the second sentence of § 75-56: "Notwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 75-15.2 ....-
117. See note 47 supra. This limitation does not limit total recovery to one thousand
dollars. An early news item on this provision commented erroneously that "[t]he act limits
recovery to a maximum of $1,000 with no right to treble damages or attorney's fees." Green &
Lehman, Consumer Protection Act of 1977, N.C. LEGAL SERVICES NEWSLETTER, July 1977, at
4.
118. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-8 (1975), discussed at text accompanying note 59 supra, is not
excluded from application by § 75-56. See note 114 supra.
119. See text accompanying notes 58 & 59 supra.
120. In addition to seeking imposition of civil penalties under § 75-15.2 against violators of
§§ 75-50 to -56, the attorney general may also proceed with criminal prosecution under N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 75-6 or -7 (1975) (providing that violation of any provision of chapter 75 is a
misdemeanor, except that violation of § 75-1.1 is not a crime), or with civil action under id. § 75-
14 (authorizing the seeking of mandatory court orders to carry out the provisions of chapter 75).
As a violation of §§ 75-50 to -56 is also a violation of § 75-1. 1, see id. § 75-56 (Cum. Supp. 1977);
text accompanying notes 110-13 supra, the attorney general may also seek an injunction under
id. § 75-15.1 (1975) as well as restoration of money or property and cancellation of contracts.
121. N.C. GEN STAT. § 75-16 (Cum. Supp. 1977), quoted in note 127 infra. The treble
damage provision of § 75-16 is made expressly inapplicable to violations of §§ 75-50 to -56. Id. §
75-56.
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available, simple damages may be awarded. 122 The third limitation imposed
by section 75-56 prohibits the assessment of attorneys' fees, which are
otherwise available with certain qualifications under section 75-16.1.123
The final clause of section 75-56,124 which provides that the debt
collection provisions confer no new right of private action, appears to
impose a major additional limitation. The limitation, however, has little
practical effect; it explicitly recognizes the continued availability of rights of
private action that were "already available at common law or by means of
other specific statutory authorization." 125 This clause, therefore, recognizes
the injured party's right to bring any tort action that is otherwise available
with respect to the types of conduct prohibited by the debt collection
provisions. 126 The major effect of the clause is to preserve the right of
private action made available by section 75-16127 against violators "of the
122. Section 75-56 prohibits only the trebling of damages to be awarded under § 75-16:
"[N]or shall damages be trebled." Id. There is no reference to the cause of action granted by §
75-16.
123. In any suit instituted by a person who alleges that the defendant violated G.S. 75-
1.1, the presiding judge may, in his discretion, allow a reasonable attorney fee to the
duly licensed attorney representing the prevailing party, such attorney fee to be taxed
as a part of the court costs and payable by the losing party, upon a finding by the
presiding judge that:
(1) The party charged with the violation has willfully engaged in the act or practice,
and there was an unwarranted refusal by such party to pay the claim which
constitutes the basis of such suit; or
(2) The party instituting the action knew, or should have known, the action was
frivolous and malicious.
Id. § 75-16.1 (1975). Section 75-16.1 is also made expressly inapplicable to actions under §§ 75-
50 to -56. See id. § 75-56 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
124. Id. § 75-56 (Cum. Supp. 1977), quoted in note 114 supra.
125. Id.
126. Among the causes of action in tort that may apply to debt collection abuses arc libel
and slander, invasion of privacy, interference with contractual relations, intentional or negli-
gent infliction of mental distress, and abuse of process. In practice, however, common law torts
do not provide effective remedies for collection abuses in North Carolina, for North Carolina
courts have consistently limited their application rather severely in this field. See, e.g., Penner
v. Elliott, 225 N.C. 33, 33 S.E.2d 124 (1945) (cause of action for libel and slander will not lie for
a statement made publicly to the effect that plaintiff will not pay his debts, will not work and is a
person with whom respectable people will not associate). See generally CALIFORNIA CONTINU-
INC EDUCATION OF THE BAR, PRACTICE BOOK No. 52, DEBT COLLECTION TORT PRACTICE (C.
Brosnahan ed. 1971); Frenzel, Creditors Rights and Ancillary Remedies: Post Judgment, in 2
NORTH CAROLINA BAR ASSOCIATION INSTITUTE ON DEBTOR-CREDITOR RIGHTS AND REMEDIES X-l
(1974); Greenfield, Coercive Collection Tactics-An Analysis of the Interests and the Remedies,
1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 1; Martin, A Creditor's Liability for Unreasonable Collection Efforts: The
Evolution of a Tort in Texas, 9 S. TEX. L.J. 127 (1967); Outrage and Emotional Distress: New
Directions in Tort Law, 7 N.C. RESEARCHER 445 (1976).
127. If any person shall be injured or the business of any person, firm or corporation
shall be broken up, destroyed or injured by reason of any act or thing done by any
other person, firm or corporation in violation of the provisions of this Chapter, such
person, firm or corporation so injured shall have a right of action on account of such
injury done, and if damages are assessed in such case judgment shall be rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for treble the amount fixed by the
verdict.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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provisions of this Chapter [75],"128 as section 75-16 unquestionably consti-
tutes "specific statutory authorization" 129 of a right of private action. It is
true that section 75-56 limits the damages that may be awarded in such an
action to simple damages, 130 but nothing in section 75-56 invalidates the
right conferred on the injured party by section 75-16 to bring an action for
damages. 13 1
128. Id.
129. Id. § 75-56, quoted in note 114 supra.
130. See text accompanying notes 121 & 122 supra.
131. See note 122 supra. This provision was misinterpreted by early commentators who
stated erroneously that "[t]here is no private right of action so that to get the $1,000 penalty,
.you would have to add the 75-1.1 claim to a tort claim such as one for invasion of privacy or
intentional infliction of emotional distress." Green & Lehman, supra note 117, at 4. Under no
circumstances is the civil penalty awarded to the plaintiff in a private action. The civil penalty is
imposed only in civil actions brought by the attorney general, and any such penalty must be paid
to the General Fund of the State of North Carolina. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-15.2 (Cum. Supp.
1977), quoted in note 47 supra.
The probable intent of the final clause of § 75-56 was to deny to consumers the right to
bring private actions for violations of §§ 75-50 to -56. These sections were added to the
legislation at the last minute in response to objections voiced by representatives of the North
Carolina Bankers Association and the North Carolina Merchants Association, who felt that the
general provisions of § 75-1.1 did not provide enough guidance as to what collection activities
would be prohibited. The Bankers Association was particularly interested in limiting consumer
suits because of concern about "nuisance" suits. The debt collection provisions were drafted
jointly by representatives of the North Carolina Bankers Association and of the attorney
general's office at the request of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary II, after the committee
had already approved the bill without those provisions. The new sections were then adopted by
the committee, but they were not discussed by it. Letter to the author from Alan S. Hirsch,
supra note 112; Telephone Interview with Alan S. Hirsch (Nov. 4, 1977).
It appears likely that the relationship of the last clause of § 75-56 to the pre-existing
provisions of chapter 75, particularly § 75-16, was simply overlooked. Therefore, while the
language of § 75-56 clearly preserves the right of action granted by § 75-16, the drafters of the
legislation probably did not intend the clause to have that effect.
In contrast to the North Carolina law, there is currently no right of private action under the
FTC Act. Holloway v. Bristol-Myers, 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973). But see Guernsey v. Rich
Plan of the Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (recognizing a limited right of private
action under § 5 of the FTC Act). The House version of a bill currently pending in the United
States Congress originally included a provision that would have permitted both individual and
class actions by consumers under the FTC Act. H.R. 3816, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1977),
H.R. REP. No. 339, supra note 43. In floor debate, however, the bill was amended to eliminate
that provision. 123 CONG. REC. HI0,901 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1977). See generally Note, Federal
Trade Commission Act: A Private Cause of Action for Consumers, 9 CONN. L. REv. 294 (1977);
Note, Consumer Protection-Standing, 28 S.C.L. REV. 711 (1977).
Section 813 of the new federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692k
(West Supp. Pamphlet No. 3 1977), authorizes individual and class actions by consumers.
However, id. § 1692k(a)(3) provides that the court may award attorneys' fees to the defendant
if the action "was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment." This provision may
have been included in response to several congressmen who opposed the availability of private
actions on the ground that the suits would be brought by "lawyers, possibly of questionable
motivation, for technical violations." G. HANSEN, R. KELLY, J. RoUSSELOT & C. GRASSLEY,
SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS ON H.R. 5294, H.R. REP. No. 131, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1977).
The general concern about frivolous lawsuits against creditors is reflected in H.R. 9555,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), which was introduced in Congress on October 13, 1977. Section 8
of this bill provides for redress for creditors who are objects of frivolous consumer actions. For
an excellent discussion of the pros and cons of consumer class actions, see AMERICAN ENTER-
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The denial of a right of private action for violation of the debt collec-
tion provisions would have lessened the effectiveness of the new law
immensely. 132 When the right of private action was added to chapter 75 in
1969, it was characterized as "the most significant portion of the new North
Carolina legislation,' ' 133 and it was suggested that this provision might be
the key to effective enforcement of section 75-1.1.134 Although private
actions may be brought for violations of the debt collection provisions, the
combined effect of the limitation on damages and the denial of attorneys'
fees will be to discourage their use against debt collectors. Actual damages
resulting from abusive collection practices may be relatively insignificant;
without the possibility of recovering treble damages and attorneys' fees,
consumers will have little incentive to bring a suit. 35
V. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
The major substantive weakness of the CPA is the inapplicability of the
debt collection provisions to some debt collectors. 3 6 Under these provi-
sions, the attorney general may act only against debt collectors who are not
collection agencies and who are collecting from consumer debtors; 137 in
addition, it is only those debt collectors who are subject to private actions by
consumers under the CPA. 138 The activities of collection agencies are
PRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS No. 8, CONSUMER
CLASS ACTIONS (1977).
132. The availability of private remedies is one of the three "major principles" of the
MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT ACT 1973:
[Aldequate private remedies must exist so that consumers affected by illegal practices
can obtain effective judicial redress. Even the most efficient of administrative agen-
cies cannot police the day-to-day practices of an industry as large and pervasive in our
economy as consumer credit. Consumers aggrieved by illegal practices-can and should
be their own best advocates.
Id. Introduction at v.
133. Comment, supra note 2, at 900.
134. Id. See also Morgan, supra note 2, at 14.
135. The provisions for treble damages, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (Cum. Supp. 1977), and
attorneys' fees, id. § 75-16.1 (1975), serve as an inducement to private enforcement of chapter
75. See Comment, supra note 2, at 900; Note, supra note 2, at 487. The unavailability of
significant recovery is likely to discourage consumers from filing actions for damages under §
75-16 for violations of §§ 75-50 to -56, and such an action appears to be the only action available
to the individual consumer against violators of the debt collection provisions. As a violation of
§§ 75-50 to -56 is a misdemeanor under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-6 (1975), the consumer could not
seek injunctive relief. See Carolina Motor Serv., Inc. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 210 N.C. 36,
185 S.E. 479 (1936) (plaintiff in a private action may not seek injunctive relief for criminal acts).
Professor Aycock points out that this limitation on injunctions against criminal acts "appears to
be no bar to a suit for injunction brought by a victim of an unfair trade practice proscribed by
[section 75-1.1]," as § 75-6 provides that a violation of § 75-1.1 is not a crime, Aycock, supra
note 2, at 255. But see text accompanying notes 82-88 supra (discussing whether §§ 75-50 to -56
are independent provisions or merely a clarification of § 75-1.1).
136. See text accompanying notes 70-77 supra.
137. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-50(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
138. Consumers, of course, may bring a tort action against any debt collector. But see note
126 supra (tort remedies for debt collection abuses in North Carolina are generally ineffective).
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regulated by administrative regulations139 issued by the Commissioner of
Insurance." 4° Since the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act141 be-
came effective on March 20, 1978, North Carolina collection agencies have
been subject to federal regulation. 42 Collection practices in North Carolina
thus are subject to regulation by two state agencies, the Department
of Justice and the Department of Insurance, as well as the federal govern-
ment. 143 Effective, consistent enforcement of debt collection standards
would be much more likely if enforcement authority were vested in only one
139. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, §§ 13.0200-.0221 (1978). These regulations relate primarily
to the mechanics of acquiring the required license and bond and to the preparation and approval
of forms to be used by the collection agencies. The regulations, however, set forth a list of
"prohibited collection practices," id. § 13.0221, and many of the listed practices closely
resemble those prohibited in §§ 75-51 to -55 of the CPA. For example, the regulations prohibit a
collection agency from:
(3) communicating with the debtor or person related to the debtor with such
frequency or at such unusual hours in such a manner as can reasonably be expected to
threaten or harass the debtor;
(5) communicating with the debtor or the debtor's family after being notified in
writing by an attorney for the debtor that all future communication should be with the
attorney;
(I I) threatening action unless like action is taken in regular course of business or
is intended for that particular debt ....
Id. Subsection (3) is similar to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-52(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977); (5) is similar to
id. § 75-55(3); and (11) is similar to id. § 75-51(7).
140. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-46 (1975). The regulations that are currently in force, N.C.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, §§ 13.0200-.0221 (1978), went into effect on January 1, 1978. Similar
regulations with an effective date of February 1, 1976, had been issued previously, but, because
of irregularities in the promulgation of automobile insurance regulations that were issued at the
same time, there was some question as to whether any of the Department of Insurance
regulations ever became legally effective. See American Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Ingram,
32 N.C. App. 552, 233 S.E.2d 398, cert. denied, 292 N.C. 729, 235 S.E.2d 782 (1977). On
September 26, 1977, a hearing was held on a revised version of the previously adopted
collection agency regulations, and the current regulations were subsequently promulgated.
Letter to the author from Mary K.B. Britt, Acting Deputy Commissioner, Special Services
Division, N.C. Dep't of Insurance (Oct. 19, 1977) (copy on file in office of North Carolina Law
Review); Telephone Interview with Mary K.B. Britt (Jan. 23, 1978).
141. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1692-1692o (West Supp. Pamphlet No. 3 1977).
142. State laws will be preempted only to the extent that they are inconsistent with the
federal law:
This title does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any person subject to the
provisions of this title from complying with the laws of any State with respect to debt
collection practices, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with any
provision of this title, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency. For purposes of
this section, a State law is not inconsistent with this title if the protection such law
affords any consumer is greater than the protection provided by this title.
Id. § 1692n. See generally H.R. REP. No. 131, supra note 131, at 7-8; 123 CoNG. REC. H2922
(daily ed. April 4, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Annunzio).
143. Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 16921 (West Supp.
Pamphlet No. 3 1977), the FTC has general enforcement authority; violations of the Act are
deemed unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of the FTC Act. It is noteworthy that
id. § 16921(d) prohibits the FTC from promulgating regulations or rules with respect to the debt
collection practices of debt collectors who are subject to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.
See generally CONG. REC., supra note 142, at H2921 (remarks of Rep. Annunzio).
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agency; this would be possible only if the debt collection provisions of the
CPA applied to all debt collectors. The federal Fair Debt Collection Prac-
tices Act authorizes the FTC to grant exemptions from the federal law where
state law provides substantially similar requirements, provided that enforce-
ment provisions are adequate. 144 If the provisions of sections 75-50 to 75-56
also applied to collection agencies, North Carolina would be eligible for an
exemption from the federal law. 45 As a result, all enforcement authority in
the field of debt collection practices would be vested in one official, the
attorney general, with the likely concomitant result that enforcement would
be more effective and consistent.
144. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692o (West Supp. Pamphlet No. 3 1977). Apparently a state must sub-
mit an application in order to obtain such an exemption. See CONG. REc., supra note 142, at
H2922 (remarks of Rep. Annunzio).
The federal statute limiting garnishment includes a similar provision that authorizes the
Secretary of Labor to exempt states from the federal limitations "if he determines that the laws
of that State provide restrictions on garnishment which are substantially similar to those
provided in [the federal law]." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1675 (West Supp. Pamphlet No. 2 1977). The
regulations that the Secretary of Labor has promulgated under this section may give some
indication of what type of regulations the FTC will adopt to implement the exemption provi-
sions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. See Restriction on Garnishment, 29 C.F.R. §8
870.50-.57 (1976). So far only Kentucky and Virginia have been,granted exemptions from the
garnishment limitations. Id. § 870.57(a), (b).
145. Of course, North Carolina could seek an exemption from the federal law on the basis
of the North Carolina Department of Insurance regulations relating to collection agencies. See
notes 139 & 140 supra. It is not clear, however, that an exemption would be granted on the basis
of administrative regulations alone. See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §
1692n (West Supp. Pamphlet No. 3 1977), quoted in note 142 supra (referring to "the last's of
any state" (emphasis added)). It is also possible that the enforcement provisions tinder the
regulations would be considered inadequate. The only remedies available against agencies that
violate the regulations are (1) criminal prosecution for a misdemeanor under N.C. GEN. STAT. §
66-47 (1975) or (2) revocation of the collection agency permit under id. § 66-45. The only ground
for holding a revocation hearing is "that the holder of the permit is not conducting his business
in a businesslike way." Id. In practice, very few permits are revoked. In 1976, for example, the
permits of four agencies were revoked following hearings. In each of these cases, the principal
ground for revocation was improper handling of trust accounts. Letter to the author from Mary
K.B. Britt, supra note 140.
Although a final decision has not been made, the North Carolina Department of Insurance
is giving serious consideration to applying for an exemption from the federal law. Id. The
Department is also considering seeking legislation that would incorporate the collection agency
regulations into chapter 66 of the General Statutes. Telephone Interview with Mary K.B. Britt,
Acting Deputy Commissioner, Special Services Division, N.C. Dep't of Insurance (Nov. 4,
1977). This would give collection agencies more effective notice of what is expected of them
and would probably provide a stronger basis for exemption from the federal law.
Even if the state is granted an exemption from the federal law, the state could still make
use of the federal law to reach out-of-state collection agencies that operate illegally in North
Carolina. Currently the Department of Insurance and the Department of Justice are virtually
powerless against such violators. The creditor who employs such an agency, however, may be
guilty of a misdemeanor under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-41 (1975). See also Divine v. Watauga
Hosp., 137 F. Supp. 628 (M.D.N.C. 1956) (federal court, applying North Carolina law, refused
to enforce a contract between a North Carolina creditor and an out-of-state collection agency
on the ground that the contract was illegal because of the agency's noncompliance with North
Carolina law).
TRADE REGULATION
The failure to integrate the new sections governing debt collection
practices with the pre-existing provisions of the chapter is the major techni-
cal weakness of the new legislation. This lack of integration is apparent in
three areas. First, the effect of the exemption for professionals that is created
by section 75-1.1 (b)14 on the debt collection provisions of sections 75-50 to
75-56 is uncertain. t4 7 Secbnd, although it is clear that under section 75-6
violations of sections 75-50 to 75-56 are misdemeanors, it is not clear that
the drafters of the legislation intended them to be criminal violations. 14,
Third, while it appears that the drafters of the legislation intended to prohibit
private actions for violations of the debt collection provisions, the language
of the last clause of section 75-56 clearly preserves the right of private action
created by section 75-16.149
This lack of integration probably resulted from the last-minute decision
to add specific debt collection provisions to the CPA. 150 If these provisions
had been introduced at an earlier stage of the legislative process, when they
would have been subjected to examination and discussion in committee, it is
likely that some of these matters would have been clarified. The lack of
integration does not seriously weaken the new law, but, at the very least, it
is likely to give rise to otherwise unnecessary litigation.
SUSAN WRIGHT MASON
146. See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra.
147. See text accompanying notes 79-88 supra.
148. See notes 120 & 135 supra. Although it appears likely that the drafters of the
legislation were not aware that violations would be misdemeanors, there is really no reason that
criminal penalties should -not be imposed against offending collectors. As collection agencies in
North Carolina are subject to criminal prosecution for violation of the regulations governing
their collection practices, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-47 (1975), it seems appropriate that creditor
collectors be subject to the same penalties. There is precedent in other jurisdictions for
subjecting violators of a general debt collection law to criminal prosecution. See, e.g., TEx.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.09 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977) (violation is a misdemeanor
with fines of not less than $100 nor more than $500).
149. See note 131 supra.
150. Id.
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